

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Approx 25 Apr

2003

ONTRICH DEBRIEFING

SKILLET/ONTRICH/Galvez Negotiations

RE: A. DIR 46015
B. DIR 45998
C. [] 085
D. [] 108
E. DIR 46306
F. [] 128
G. [] 075
H. DIR 45322

I. [] 104
J. DIR 45776
K. [] 140
L. [] 141
M. [] 137
N. [] 135
O. [] 096
P. [] 093

The above ref cables plus pouched messages to LINCOLN give a complete picture of ONTRICH'S activities during 25 March to 10 April, 1954, stay in Tegucigalpa and trip to San Salvador.

During a three hour meeting between SKILLET/ONTRICH on 9 April, SKILLET informed ONTRICH that he had been told on the highest possible authority before departing Washington that his job was to see that equipment transited his country and that if he exceeded his authority, to make sure nobody could prove it and there was plausible denial.

All of ONTRICH'S work was also on a plausible denial basis, since it is virtually impossible to get any work done otherwise.

All contacts made by SKILLET with Honduran officials made use of, all possible cutouts and all without witnesses. SKILLET is in a good position to deny all if the necessity ever arises. He always prefaced every discussion on the subject with the United States non-intervention theme and on a personal basis he would like to see Communism unrooted in the Hemisphere.

At this point the danger of the Honduran officials involved

disclosing U. S. intervention is small since after the first shipment of arms was received by them makes them accomplices and they will never burn themselves in order to disclose intervention on the part of Uncle Sam.

The Honduran political situation at the present time is much more delicate than any situation they could ever put the U. S. in.

The political situation in Honduras was such at the time ONTRICH met [] and [] personal problems were so bad that short of applying all possible means of pressure, including the use of [] would have been completely ineffectual in getting [] to take positive action at this time.

It was perfectly obvious after both SKILLET's and ONTRICH's first contact with [] that nobody was under any kind of illusion about the WHITE PAPER or U. S. ^{side} and if SKILLET or ONTRICH had tried in any way to deceive [] it would have been impossible for SKILLET to set up the excellent rapport with [] which has allowed us to advance PBSUCCESS to the present stage.

At the time of ONTRICH's arrival in Tegucigalpa on 25 March, [] had not disclosed his meeting with [] to anyone except [] therefore, [] was the only possible person through whom ONTRICH could arrange a meeting with [] This contact was arranged by ONTRICH with SKILLET who delivered a sealed envelope with ONTRICH's name to [] who in turn delivered

it to [] This means of contact was satisfactory and the [] furnished ONTRICH with his personal phone number and a time for ONTRICH to call.

After ONTRICH's contact with [] it was obvious the man was willing to help but had many problems, some of which were political, others personal. At that time his biggest problem concerning PBSUCCESS was selecting a loyal and trustworthy representative.

With all operations stalemated because of the [] indecision and [] which would have possibly turned the government into chaos, it was necessary to take positive steps to remedy the situation. []

[] other situations gave SKILLET a wonderful opportunity to get close to [] to discuss the ~~problem~~ and throw in two cents worth for PBSUCCESS. By the time the [] problem was settled, in which SKILLET played the major role, there was a very close personal relationship between [] and SKILLET. In the meantime ONTRICH had approached [] and [] was in constant contact with [] on the problems of PBSUCCESS.

The big break came when [] cut his [] in on the matter. This gave CALLEGERIS and ONTRICH a direct channel to [] and a means by which to alleviate many of his problems and worries, especially the one concerning CALLEGERIS []

After [] felt safer about his political situation and his

personal problems were somewhat relieved by good news about his

[] in New York, he proceeded immediately to select his representative who turned out to be []

[]. This was reported to SKILLET by []

ONTRICH's plans were then to place himself in personal contact with

[] and work out the details for the arrival of the first flights.

At this point ONTRICH was recalled to LINCOLN for debriefing.